Stemming from the many debates on the skew-incentive program, on Discord, I have decided to put forth a modified criteria for inclusion/distribution of the incentive model, in hopes of addressing some of the (very valid) concerns about the current implementation, as well as (hopefully) reducing the need for manual governance-interaction week to week.
I propose we implement and set the following system variables:
MinAssetGlobalShare- Minimum threshold, as a % of the global debt pool, for asset to be included in the incentive round. Should be sUSD value, as a sum of BOTH long/short synths.
MinAssetSkewPct- Minimum gap between long/short tokens. Calculation in ratio of base tokens,
RewardAmount- Amount of SNX to distribute, divided proportionally to the sUSD-skew of each asset meeting the above requirements
If we set the variables as following:
MinAssetGlobalShare = .02
MinAssetSkewPct = .10
RewardAmount = 32000
The incentive pool for this period would be:
iBTC: 30103.78 SNX sETH: 1896.22 SNX
Currently, BTC is ~36m sUSD off-skew, while ETH is only ~2m, and iETH is actually over-skew, so in fact sETH would be incentivised for this period, under this model (which I personally think is the correct outcome).
As assets become more in-line, they will lose their incentive, which may make the more transient farmers look elsewhere, but i think long term this creates a more stable skew-farming cohort, who are intending to be short these assets long-term, and would like the free money on top. It also can also react to large shifts more automatically and immediately than I feel governance is able to, at this time.
There are likely more wrinkles that need to be added to this, and I am confident that we have enough big-brains here to massage this into a more hardened system, but I believe it is a good direction to move towards.
I look forward to feedback!